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It has long been recognized that the amplitude of the P300 component of event-related
brain potentials is sensitive to the degree to which eliciting stimuli are surprising to the
observers (Donchin, 1981). While Squires et al. (1976) showed and modeled dependencies
of P300 amplitudes from observed stimuli on various time scales, Mars et al. (2008) pro-
posed a computational model keeping track of stimulus probabilities on a long-term time
scale. We suggest here a computational model which integrates prior information with
short-term, long-term, and alternation-based experiential influences on P300 amplitude
fluctuations. To evaluate the new model, we measured trial-by-trial P300 amplitude fluctu-
ations in a simple two-choice response time task, and tested the computational models of
trial-by-trial P300 amplitudes using Bayesian model evaluation. The results reveal that the
new digital filtering (DIF) model provides a superior account of the trial-by-trial P300 ampli-
tudes when compared to both Squires et al.’s (1976) model, and Mars et al.’s (2008) model.
We show that the P300-generating system can be described as two parallel first-order
infinite impulse response (IIR) low-pass filters and an additional fourth-order finite impulse
response (FIR) high-pass filter. Implications of the acquired data are discussed with regard
to the neurobiological distinction between short-term, long-term, and working memory as
well as from the point of view of predictive coding models and Bayesian learning theories
of cortical function.
Keywords: predictive surprise, Bayesian surprise, event-related brain potentials, P300, single trial EEG, digital
filtering
1. INTRODUCTION
The notion of a Bayesian brain is increasingly recognized as pro-
viding a distinctive framework for investigating cognitive brain
functions (Kersten et al., 2004; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston,
2005; Doya et al., 2007). Predictive coding theories of cortical
function provide a possible route to the Bayesian brain (Friston,
2002). According to the predictive coding approach, constraints
from higher levels of a cortical hierarchy provide contextual guid-
ance to lower levels of processing, providing a theory of how
bottom-up evidence is combined with top-down priors to com-
pute the most likely interpretation of sensory data. Specifically,
predictive coding theory proposes that an internal representa-
tion of the world generates predictions that are compared with
stimulus-driven activity to calculate the residual error between
the predicted and the actual information. The residual error is
then used to update the internal representation so as to minimize
the residual error imposed by future stimuli (Friston, 2002, 2005;
Spratling, 2010).
The general scheme of predictive coding as a ubiquitous mode
of cortical processing offers an instrumental framework for analyz-
ing functional correlates of the P300 event-related brain potential
(Sutton et al., 1965; Kopp, 2008). It has long been recognized
that fluctuations in P300 amplitude reflect the degree of surprise
related to the processing of attended, but unforeseeable sensory
events. In particular (Donchin, 1981) argued that P300 amplitude
is not crucially determined by the inherent attributes of elicit-
ing events. Instead of that, he ascertained that “surprising events
elicit a large P300 component” (p. 498). Squires et al. (1976) had
presented a model of P300 amplitude fluctuations, based on the
concept of expectancy, which was thought to be determined by
three factors: “(i) the memory for event frequency within the prior
stimulus sequence, (ii) the specific structure of the prior sequence,
and (iii) the global probability of the event” (p. 1144).
More recently, Mars et al. (2008) proposed a computational
model of processes underlying the generation of the P300 in which
trial-by-trial fluctuations in P300 amplitudes were explained in
terms of a Bayesian observer keeping track of the global prob-
abilities of sensory events. The subjective estimates of statistical
regularities in the environment were thought to depend crucially
on the integration of sensory data over long periods of time.
However, the adequacy of this Bayesian observer model is limited,
because it cannot account appropriately for the well-documented
effects of the recent stimulus sequence on P300 amplitudes (e.g.,
Squires et al., 1976; Leuthold and Sommer, 1993).
Here we tested these two state-of-the-art models against a newly
developed computational model of trial-by-trial P300 amplitude
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 6 | Article 359 | 1
Kolossa et al. Trial-by-trial modeling of predictive surprise
fluctuations by Bayesian model selection (Kass and Raftery, 1995;
Raftery, 1995). The new model assumes three additive digital filter-
ing processes, thereby integrating aspects of both state-of-the-art
models. Specifically, subjective estimates of statistical regulari-
ties in sensory data are kept at short-term and long-term decay
time parameters. Further it implements an alternation term (as
Squires et al., 1976) as well as uniform initial prior probabilities
(as Mars et al., 2008). Our findings show that this new approach
provides a superior account of parietally distributed trial-by-trial
P300 amplitudes compared to these two state-of-the-art models.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. PARTICIPANTS, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, AND DATA
ACQUISITION
Sixteen healthy participants [fourteen women, mean age: 20 years;
age range 18–23 years; mean handedness (Oldfield, 1971): 74;
handedness range −76–100], all with normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity participated in the experiment. All were
recruited from introductory courses at the Department of Psy-
chology at the Technische Universität Braunschweig in return
for course credit. Experimental procedures were approved by the
local ethics committee and in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Participants performed a simple two-choice response time [RT]
task without feedback about response accuracy in which all stimuli
had equal behavioral relevance. This feature of the experimental
design constitutes an important difference between this and the
classical oddball paradigm (Ritter and Vaughan, 1969) in which
participants usually discriminate between task-relevant (target)
and irrelevant (standard) stimuli.
The experiment was realized using the Presentation® software
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA). Visual stimuli were
presented one at a time for 100 ms each, with a stimulus presen-
tation rate of fs= 2/3 Hz, i.e., one stimulus per 1.5 s. Stimuli were
displayed at the center of a CRT monitor (FlexScan T766 19′′;
Eizo, Hakusan, Ishikawa, Japan) with a refresh rate of 100 Hz at a
resolution of 1280× 1024 pixels against a light gray background.
Viewing distance amounted to 1.25 m. Two types of visual stim-
uli were presented: the stimulus event was either a red or a blue
rectangle, each of which subtended approximately 2.75˚× 2.25˚.
Participants were required to respond to each stimulus with
the previously associated button as quickly as possible but not at
the expense of accuracy. They used the index finger of both hands
(e.g., left button on response to the red rectangle, right button
in response to the blue rectangle). Stimulus-response mapping
(i.e., [red-left, blue-right] or [red-right, blue-left], respectively)
was counterbalanced over participants.
Participants performed twelve blocks of N = 192 trials of the
two-choice RT task. The probability of the occurrence of each
stimulus event was manipulated between blocks such that the rel-
ative probabilities of events were either 0.5 for each event, across
six consecutive blocks (1152 trials overall), or [0.3, 0.7], across the
remaining six consecutive blocks (1152 trials overall). Stimulus-
probability mapping was counterbalanced over participants (i.e., a
stimulus color identified the rare (0.3) stimulus in fifty percent of
the participants but the frequent stimulus (0.7) in the remaining
participants).
The order of the probability manipulation was counterbalanced
over participants (probability category [0.5, 0.5] prior to [0.3,
0.7] or vice versa) who were not informed about these probabili-
ties. Participants were informed that the two different stimuli were
randomly distributed across blocks. Between the blocks a break
was scheduled, participants were free to initiate the subsequent
block at their own pace.
A continuous electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using
a QuickAmps-72 amplifier (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany)
and the BrainVision Recorder® Version 1.02 software (Brain Prod-
ucts, Gilching, Germany) from frontal (F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8), central
(T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8), parietal (P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8), occipital (O1,
O2), and mastoid (M1, M2) sites. Ag-AgCl EEG electrodes were
used which were mounted on an EasyCap (EasyCap, Herrsching-
Breitbrunn, Germany). Electrode impedance was kept below
10 k. All EEG electrodes were referenced to average reference
during the recording.
For each participant, the actual stimulus sequence of each prob-
ability category [0.5, 0.5], and [0.3, 0.7], respectively, was random-
ized only once in order to enhance the reliability of the sequential
trial-by-trial P300 estimates (see below). Thus, each participant
received solely one truly random arrangement of trials in each
probability category. This arrangement was repeatedly presented
across all six blocks of each probability category, unbeknownst to
participants. In consequence, sequential P300 estimates could be
averaged over the six sequence repetitions per probability cate-
gory, thereby improving the notoriously low signal-to-noise ratio
of single-trial EEG data. Task-related brain activity of a single trial
is much more obscured by task-unrelated brain activity than is
task-related activity averaged across trials (Blankertz et al., 2002).
Participants were informed about the problem of non-cerebral
artifacts, and they were encouraged to reduce the occurrence of
movement artifacts (Picton et al., 2000). Ocular artifacts were
monitored by means of bipolar pairs of electrodes positioned at
the sub and supraorbital ridges (vertical electrooculogram, vEOG)
and at the external ocular canthi (horizontal electrooculogram,
hEOG). The EEG and EOG channels were subject to a bandpass
of 0.01–30 Hz and digitized at 250 Hz sampling rate.
Off-line analysis of the EEG data was performed by means of
the BrainVision Analyzer® Version 2.0.1 software (Brain Prod-
ucts, Gilching, Germany). Careful manual artifact rejection was
performed before averaging to discard trials during which eye
movements, or any other non-cerebral artifact except blinks, had
occurred. Deflections in the averaged EOG waveforms were small
indicating that fixation was well maintained in those trials that
survived the manual artifact rejection process. Semi-automatic
blink detection and the application of an established method for
blink artifact removal were employed for blink correction (Grat-
ton et al., 1983). A digital high-pass filter was applied to the data
(0.75 Hz cutoff frequency, 48 db/oct) in order to eliminate low-
frequency variations in the EEG signal which were associated with
the occasional occurrence of electro-dermal artifacts.
The EEG was then divided into epochs of 1000 ms duration,
starting 100 ms before stimulus onset. Epochs were corrected
using the interval [−100, 0 ms] before stimulus presentation as
the baseline. As a start, event-related potential (ERP) waveforms
were created (Luck, 2005). ERP waveforms were calculated as trial
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averages for each participant and for each event probability [i.e.,
0.5, 0.3, 0.7], with the exception that those trials in which the
participant selected the wrong behavioral response were excluded
from averaging.
Thereafter, trial-by-trial P300s were estimated from the EEG
data at electrode Pz, where this ERP component is traditionally
reported to be maximal (Duncan-Johnson and Donchin, 1977). To
estimate trial-by-trial P300 amplitudes, for each participant, the
time point at which the averaged P300 waveforms at Pz were mod-
ulated maximally by relative stimulus frequency in the [0.3, 0.7]
probability category was determined (M = 344 ms, SD= 48 ms;
range 280–464 ms). Identifying the P300 in single trials is a noto-
riously difficult problem, due to the low signal-to-noise ratio of
single-trial EEG data (Blankertz et al., 2002). In our study, for each
event probability, trial-by-trial P300 estimates were extracted over
a temporal window of ±60 ms around the individual time point
of maximal modulation (Barceló et al., 2008), thereby completely
ignoring latency variability across single trials (Luck, 2005). Albeit
this drawback of the method, it was nevertheless chosen in order
(1) to keep the testing environment as similar as possible to the
procedures employed by Mars et al. (2008), and (2) to improve the
reliability of trial-by-trial amplitude measures, in comparison to
peak detection measures, akin to previous studies (Debener et al.,
2005).
2.2. CONVENTIONAL DATA ANALYSIS
Trial-by-trial P300 estimates, RTs, and error rates were averaged
according to the three event probabilities [i.e., 0.3, 0.5, 0.7]. In
the [0.5, 0.5] probability category, trial-by-trial P300 estimates
were additionally averaged according to eight third-order stimu-
lus sequences (denoted as aaaa, baaa, abaa, aaba, bbaa, abba, baba,
bbba), four second-order stimulus sequences (aaa, baa, aba, bba),
and two first-order sequences (aa, ba), with up to four consecutive
trials (xxxx)= (trial n− 3, trial n− 2, trial n− 1, trial n= eliciting
event). Please note that the symbol a simply denotes one of the
two possible stimulus events while symbol b signifies the other one
in this notation. For example, if a signifies the red rectangle, then b
signifies the blue rectangle (and vice versa). In the [0.5, 0.5] prob-
ability category, sequential analysis could be collapsed across the
two possible stimulus events since both stimuli were equally prob-
able and task-relevant. The same kind of sequential analysis was
performed in the [0.3, 0.7] probability category. However, in this
experimental condition, a consistently denoted the rare stimulus
in the [0.3, 0.7] probability category, whereas b signified the fre-
quent stimulus in the [0.3, 0.7] probability category. We refrained
from analyzing the eight third-order stimulus sequences in the
[0.3, 0.7] probability category in order to obtain a sufficient num-
ber of trials entering the sequential P300 estimates. Thus, trial-
by-trial P300 estimates were solely averaged according to eight
second-order stimulus sequences (aaa, baa, aba, bba, bbb, abb,
bab, aab) and four first-order sequences (aa, ba, bb, ab) in the [0.3,
0.7] probability category, separately for rare and frequent stimuli.
Individual medians of trial-by-trial P300 estimates, RTs, and
error rates over the three event probabilities [i.e., 0.3, 0.5, 0.7]
as well as the sequential P300 estimates, generated as described
above, were submitted to repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVAs), using the Greenhouse–Geisser correction. The results
of the univariate tests are provided, using a format which gives
the uncorrected degrees of freedom, and  in order to compensate
for violations of sphericity or equal covariance among all pairs of
levels of the repeated measures (Picton et al., 2000). A measure of
effect size, η2p (partial eta squared), is also provided.
2.3. STATE OF THE ART MODELS
Let us call
Pk (n) = P
(
s (n) = k|sn−11
)
with k ∈ {1, . . . , K } (1)
an estimated subjective probability (henceforth simply called sub-
jective probability) that event k ∈ {1, . . ., K } on trial n ∈ {1, . . ., N }
will be observed, given a sequence sn−11 = (s(1), s(2), . . . , s(n −
1)) of n− 1 former stimulus observations. While n is the discrete
time index of the consecutive trials, the value N denotes the total
number of trials in a block within an experimental probability
category for one subject. Note that in (1) stimulus s(n) has not
yet been observed, therefore, a subjective probability distribution
Pk(n) for all possible stimuli k ∈ {1, . . ., K } on trial n is of interest.
However, once the stimulus k = s(n) on trial n has been observed
(which is only a single value k out of set {1, . . ., K }), the respective
subjective probability Pk(n) can be used to calculate the degree of
surprise (Shannon and Weaver, 1948; Strange et al., 2005)
I (n) = − log2 Pk=s(n) (n) . (2)
Following Mars et al. (2008), we assume the trial-by-trial P300
estimate Y (n)[µV] to be proportional to the surprise I (n)[bit]:
Y (n) ∝ I (n) (3)
Note that Squires et al. (1976) assumed direct proportionality
between the so-called expectancy Ek(n) and the trial-by-trial P300
estimate:
Y (n) ∝ Ek=s(n) (n) (4)
In the following we briefly recapitulate these two well-known
state-of-the-art approaches to compute the subjective probability
Pk(n) or expectancy Ek(n), which play the role of a dynamically
updated prior probability for learning statistical parameters of the
stimulus sequence.
2.3.1. Approach by Mars et al. (MAR)
Mars et al. (2008) proposed a Bayesian observer model (henceforth
called MAR) without forgetting according to
Pk (n) = c˜L,k (n)+ 1
(n − 1)+ K , (5)
where
c˜L,k (n) =
n−1∑
ν=1
dk (ν) (6)
counts the number of occurrences of event k until trial n− 1.
The time sequence dk(ν) holds dk(ν)= 1 if s(ν)= k, ν= 1,2, . . .,
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otherwise dk(ν)= 0. Note that ∑Kk=1 c˜L,k(n) = n − 1. As can
be easily seen in (5), the subjective probability for event k on
trial n= 1 equals a uniform initial prior Pk(1)= 1/K. After many
trials (nK, and c˜L,k(n) 1), the subjective probability approx-
imates Pk(n) ≈ c˜L,k (n)n−1 , i.e., the relative frequency of event k until
trial n− 1. Note that the index “L” of the count function c˜L,k(n)
expresses the long -term memory character of Mars’ model.
2.3.2. Approach by Squires et al. (SQU)
Unlike Mars et al. (2008), Squires et al. (1976) did not formulate
a strict computational model to compute the subjective proba-
bility Pk(n). Moreover, having investigated solely a K = 2 case,
they use the notion of expectancy1 Ek(n) for stimulus k on trial
n. While Squires et al. (1976) have described their model, hence
called SQU, partly in math, partly in words, in the following we
present a complete analytical formulation of their approach, which
is straightforward to implement in software. Their empirical for-
mulation of expectancy that event k ∈ {1, 2} will be observed on
trial n ∈ {1, . . ., N } is given as
Ek (n) = 0.505 ·Pk+0.235 · c˘S,k (n)+0.033 · c˘1,k (n)−0.027 (7)
with three expectancy contributions, namely the assumed-to-be-
known global probability Pk, a count function for the short -term
memory “S”, and a count function for the alternation expectancy
“1” (and an additive constant).
2.3.2.1. Short-termmemory. The short-term count function is
defined as
c˘S,k (n) =
n−1∑
ν=n−Ndepth
γ n−νS dk (ν) , (8)
which is different to (6), since only a limited memory span of
N depth= 5 is covered, and an exponential forgetting factor γS =
e
− 1
βS with 0≤ γ S≤ 1 and time constant 0≤βS<∞ is introduced,
with γ S= 0.6 for all probability categories (i.e., βS= 1.96). Note
that the count function (8) depends only on stimulus observations
in the recent past.
2.3.2.2. Global probability. The term Pk= P(s(n)= k) in (7)
denotes the true global probability of the stimulus being k. It
is nothing else but the relative frequency of the stimulus in the
current experimental probability category which must be made
known to this model.
2.3.2.3. Alternation expectancy. In contrast, the term
c˘1,k(n) ∈ { −3,−2, 0, 2, 3} denotes the expectancy w.r.t. alternat-
ing stimuli, and how this expectancy is met by the present stimulus
s(n). The sign of c˘1,k(n) is negative if the stimulus s(n) violates
the alternation expectation [i.e., s(n) and s(n− 1) are identical]
and positive if the alternation expectation is met [i.e., s(n) and
s(n− 1) differ from each other]. The amplitude of c˘1,k(n)depends
on the number of previous alternations in a row. The formulas for
calculating c˘1,k(n) are detailed in the Appendix.
1Squires et al. (1976) denote expectancy also as subjective probability.
gk(n)
HL(f, n)
HS(f)
H∆(f)
cL,k(n)
cS,k(n)
c∆,k(n)
αL
αS
α∆
1
C
Pk(n)
FIGURE 1 | Block diagram of the new digital filter (DIF) model with
input gk(n) in (10) and output Pk(n) in (9), digital filter transfer
functions H (f ) with 0≤ f ≤ fs/2, a stimulus presentation rate of fs
(=2/3 Hz), and probability normalizing constant 1/C.
2.3.3. Explanatory notes
In summary, (7) provides a model for expectancy that is lin-
early composed of three contributions: Firstly, the relative fre-
quency Pk of event k which equals the correct global proba-
bility throughout probability categories. Note that, in contrast
to Mars et al. (2008), the relative frequency Pk is not learned
sequentially by experience but assumed to be known by partic-
ipants. Secondly, a purely predictive limited length (N depth= 5)
exponentially decaying short-term memory [cf. count function
c˘S,k(n) in (8)]. Thirdly, an expectancy contribution in the range
−3 ≤ c˘1,k(n) ≤ +3 depending on the extent to which a
first-order alternation (aa or ba) expectation has been build up
and then met/violated within the latest observed N depth= 5 tri-
als.
2.4. PROPOSED DIGITAL FILTER MODEL
In this section we present our newly proposed model, inspired
by both Mars et al. (2008) and Squires et al. (1976). Our aim is to
unify the learned relative frequency estimation of Mars et al. (2008;
long-term) with the exponentially decaying short-term memory
and alternation expectation capabilities of Squires et al. (1976),
and to express the result in terms of a simple new digital filter (DIF)
model. Besides an additive probability-normalizing constant 1/C
(see Appendix for details), it consists of three additive contribu-
tions to subjective probability: a long-term contribution (“L”), a
short-term one (“S”), and one term capturing alternations (“1”)
as depicted in Figure 1:
Pk (n) = αL · cL,k (n)+ αS · cS,k (n)+ α1 ·
[
c1,k (n)+ 1
C
]
. (9)
There are three different count functions used, each represented
by a digital filter transfer function H (f ) applied to the common
input signal gk(n), which is given as:
gk (n) =

1
K , if n ≤ 0
(
uniform initial prior
)
1, if n > 0 and s (n) = k
0, otherwise
(10)
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gk(n) gk(n−1)
1− γS
γS
cS,k(n)cS,k(n−1)
cS,k(n)
T
T
FIGURE 2 | Block diagram of a first-order infinite impulse response
length (IIR) filter with transfer function HS(f ) equivalent to (11) or (12).
Elements T denote a delay of one trial. At the adder element ⊕, updating
of the weighted output γ S·cS,k (n−1) of the last trial n− 1 with the
weighted input (1− γ S)·gk(n−1) of the last trial results in the current output
cS,k (n). Note that via γ S·cS,k (n−1), all preceding inputs (and outputs)
influence the current output, though for the short-term memory, the
influence of trials not in the recent past is negligible.
which implicitly contains an initial prior of 1/K at the start of a
block of trials2, and a “1” wherever a past stimulus s(ν) equals the
current stimulus s(n)= k, otherwise a “0.” Note that in contrast to
the sequence dk(ν) as used in Mars et al. (2008) (6) and Squires
et al. (1976) (8) we define a model-exciting infinite length signal
gk(ν), ν ∈ {−∞, . . ., n− 2, n− 1}. The digital filter model yields
an output signal Pk(n) as given in (9). The weighting parameters
αL, αS, α1 hold αL+αS+α1= 1 and 0≤αi≤ 1, i ∈ {L,S,1}.
2.4.1. Short-term memory
The block diagram of the infinite impulse response (IIR) digital
filter is shown in Figure 2. The respective short-term memory
count function can be expressed as
cS,k (n) = 1
CS
n−1∑
ν=−∞
γ n−νS gk(ν), (11)
with some normalizing constant CS and an exponential forget-
ting factor γS = e−
1
βS with 0≤βS<∞, as with count function
c˘S,k(n) in (8). The transfer function of the short-term digital filter-
ing process as described by (11) is depicted in Figure 1 as H S(f ),
and is plotted in Figure 4 as dashed curve, revealing a smooth (i.e.,
weak) low-pass characteristic. Note that the short-term memory
count function (11) can be expressed mathematically equivalent
in a recursive form according to (see the Appendix)
cS,k (n) = (1− γS) · gk (n − 1)+ γS · cS,k (n − 1) , (12)
initialized with the uniform initial prior cS,k (0)= 1/K, which in
(11) was contained in the values gk(ν)= 1/K for ν ≤ 0 of (10).
The recursive character of (12) becomes apparent by substitut-
ing the right hand side of (12) in itself for calculating cS,k (n− 1).
Figure 2 further illustrates the updating process inherent in (12).
The input signal defined in (10) and the weights (1− γ S) and γ S
2Participants were not informed about event probabilities, therefore a uniform ini-
tial prior distribution Pk(1)= 1/K, k ∈ {1,. . .,K } is a reasonable model assumption
before any stimulus has been observed.
gk(n) gk(n−1)
1− γL,n−1
γL,n−1
cL,k(n)cL,k(n−1)
cL,k(n)
T
T
FIGURE 3 | Block diagram of a first-order infinite impulse response
length (IIR) filter with transfer function H L(f,n) equivalent to (13) or
(14). Elements T denote a delay of one trial. At the adder element ⊕,
updating of the weighted output γ L,n−1·cL,k (n− 1) of the last trial n−1 with
the weighted input (1− γ L,n−1)·gk(n−1) of the last trial results in the current
output cL,k (n). Note that via γ L,n−1·cL,k (n−1), all preceding inputs (and
outputs) influence the current output.
guarantee 0≤ cS,k (n)≤ 1. The equivalence of (11) and (12) and
the derivation of CS= γ S/(1− γ S) are shown in the Appendix.
2.4.2. Long-term memory
The long-term memory count function can be expressed as
cL,k (n) = 1
CL,n
n−1∑
ν=−∞
γ L,n (ν) gk (ν) , (13)
with the time-dependent (i.e., dynamic) exponential forgetting
factor γ L,n (ν) = ∏nυ=ν+1 γ L,υ 1−γ L,υ−11−γ L,υ (using γ L,υ = e− 1βL,υ ),
the dynamic normalizing value CL,n , and the same model-exciting
signal gk(ν) as before (10). The formulas for calculating γ L,n(ν)
and CL,n are derived in the Appendix. The transfer function of the
long-term digital filtering process as described by (13) is depicted
in Figure 1 as H L(f,n). Analog to (12) a recursive function with
the same behavior as (13) can be defined as
cL,k (n) =
(
1− γ L,n−1
) · gk (n − 1)+ γ L,n−1 · cL,k (n − 1) (14)
with the same initial value CL,k (0)= 1/K. The dynamics of the
forgetting factor of the long-term memory are detailed in the
Appendix.
Figure 3 illustrates the updating process inherent in (14). The
long-term transfer function H L(f,n) is plotted in Figure 4 as dash-
dotted curve (for n= 1) and as solid curve (for n=N = 192),
respectively. Inspection of Figure 4 reveals an initially moderate
low-pass characteristic which becomes much sharper when the
number of trials increases.
2.4.3. Alternation expectation
Finally, our model comprises a count function capturing alterna-
tions:
c1,k (n) = 1
C1
n−1∑
ν=n−4
γ1,n−ν · gk(ν) (15)
with some normalizing constant C1 and the same model-exciting
signal gk(ν) as before (10). In contrast to the short- and long-term
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FIGURE 4 | Amplitude responses of the long-term (H L(f,n), dash-dotted
and solid low-pass curves), short-term (HS(f ), dashed low-pass curve)
and alternation (H1(f ), dashed high-pass curve) filters of the DIF
model as a function of the input signal frequency f (logarithmic
scale!). The dynamic long-term filter (dash-dotted and solid curves) is
shown for n=1 and n=N =192.
IIR filters which both have a low-pass characteristic, this finite
impulse response (FIR) filter reveals a high-pass characteristic.
Its transfer function is plotted in Figure 4 as ascending dashed
curve. The coefficients γ1,n−ν are specified in more detail in the
Appendix.
2.4.4. Explanatory notes
There are two important differences to Squires et al. (1976): We
propose to use two terms with different time parameters βS and
βL,n , one accounting for the short-term memory [as in (8)], the
other one accounting for a dynamically adapted long-term mem-
ory. Secondly, we allow for N depth→∞. Moreover, the role of
negative trial indices in our model is to define the initial subjec-
tive probability distribution, which is Pk(1)= 1/K, k ∈ {1, . . ., K }
in (9), reflecting that participants were not informed about the
actual relative frequencies of events over a block of trials.
In summary, the DIF model expresses both a long-term mem-
ory contribution, and a short-term memory contribution by expo-
nential decay processes, with uniform initial subjective prior prob-
abilities, and a contribution of alternation expectation. Though
there are similarities between (7) and (9), the model of Squires
et al. (1976) uses information about the experimental design (Pk)
which was actually unknown to the participants. In contrast, the
DIF model uses only the information contained in the stimulus
sequence as observed by participants, and it always starts with
a uniform initial subjective probability distribution Pk(1)= 1/K,
k ∈ {1, . . ., K }, regardless of the actual relative frequencies of events
over a block of trials. Finally it should be noted that our new
model yields a conceptually well-defined subjective probability, as
opposed to an expectancy as in Squires et al. (1976).
2.4.5. Evaluation methods
Following Mars et al. (2008) we compared the DIF to the MAR
and SQU models using the log-Bayes factor based on the model
evidences. The evidences were approximated using the variational
free energy which consists of an accuracy and complexity term,
thus enabling the comparison and selection of competing models
(Penny et al., 2004; Friston et al., 2007; Penny, 2012). We employed
the same three-level hierarchical general linear model (GLM)
as Mars et al. (2008). For model fitting and calculation of the
model evidences we used parametric empirical Bayes (PEB) from
the spm_PEB.m function of the Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM8) software (Friston et al., 2002, 2007).
The different models (DIF, MAR, and SQU) generate the
model-specific surprise3 I `(n) or expectancy Ek,`(n) values as
regressors, with the subscript `∈ {1, . . ., L= 16} denoting the
individual participants and n ∈ {1, . . ., N = 192} being the dis-
crete time index of the consecutive trials within one block. The
first level of the GLM models the measured trial-by-trial P300
estimates Y `(n) [µV] as a linear function of the surprise I `(n)
[bit] with the intercept θ (1)` [µV], the slope ϑ (1)` [µV/bit], and an
error (1)n,`[µV] :
Y` (n) = θ (1)` + ϑ (1)` I` (n)+ (1)n,` . (16)
Note that the fitted model-based P300 estimates then follow
Ŷ`(n) = θ (1)` + ϑ (1)` I`(n). (17)
The second level models the participant -specific parameters
θ
(1)
` and ϑ
(1)
` as deviations from the corresponding group parameters
θ (2) [µV ] and ϑ (2)[µV /bit]:
θ
(1)
` = θ (2) + (2)θ ,` (18)
ϑ
(1)
` = ϑ (2) + (2)ϑ ,`. (19)
The third level functions as a shrinkage prior on the group
parameters. In matrix notation the GLM structure is
Y = X(1)2(1) + E(1)
2(1) = X(2)2(2) + E(2)
2(2) = X(3)2(3) + E(3).
(20)
Y= [Y`=1, . . ., Y`=L]T ∈R2NL× 1 is a vector concatenating the
trial-by-trial P300 estimates for all participants, with []T being
the transpose, making Y a column vector. The participant-
specific vector Y`= [Y `(n= 1), . . ., Y `(n= 2N )]∈R1× 2N con-
tains the trial-by-trial P300 estimates for one participant, aver-
aged over the six sequence repetitions, for both probability cat-
egories. The first level design matrix X(1) ∈R2NL× 2L is block-
diagonal with L partitions X(1)` = [12N I`] ∈ R2N×2, each
of which contains an all-one column vector 12N of length 2N,
and surprise values I`= [I `(n= 1), . . ., I `(n= 2N )]T ∈R2N × 1
3In the following, whenever I `(n) is used, Ek= s(n),`(n) can be used interchangeably.
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as explanatory variables. The second level design matrix
X(2)= 1L⊗I2× 2= [I2× 2,`=1, . . ., I2× 2,`=L]T ∈R2L× 2 is the Kro-
necker product of an all-one column vector 1L of length L
and an identity matrix I2× 2. The third level design matrix
X(3) shall have all-zero elements. The unknown level-one para-
meters θ (1)` and ϑ
(1)
` are assembled in the parameter vector
2(1) = [θ (1)`=1,ϑ (1)`=1, . . . , θ (1)`=L ,ϑ (1)`=L]T ∈ R2L×1. Likewise, the sec-
ond level parameters θ (2) and ϑ (2) are assembled in the vector
2(2) ∈R2× 1. All errors are assumed to be normally distributed
E(j) ∼ N (0,6(j) ). The covariance is parameterized following
6
(j)
 = λ(j)I(j), with I(j) as an identity matrix with the same
dimension as the number of rows of the design matrix of the
corresponding level X(j). The hyperparameters λ(j) are the free
parameters of the hierarchical linear model and are estimated
using an EM algorithm for maximum likelihood estimation.
The conditional means of the first level parameters µ(1)2|Y of
the posterior densities N (µ(j)2|Y ,6
(j)
2|Y ) were used as maximum
a posteriori point estimates of the parameters for the model fit-
ting for the Figures 6–8 and the calculation of the mean squared
error (MSE) and fraction of variance explained (FVE) between
Yˆ`(n) and Y`(n) in Table 4 (Friston et al., 2002). The log-evidences
or marginal log-likelihoods of the models F = ln(p(Y |M)), with
p(Y |M) being the likelihood of the data Y given the modelM,
were used for model comparison via the log-Bayes factor ln(BF)
which is the natural logarithm of the quotient of the model like-
lihoods or the difference in log-evidence (Kass and Raftery, 1995;
Penny et al., 2004; Friston et al., 2007):
ln (BFDIF−XXX) = ln
(
p (Y|MDIF)
p (Y|MXXX)
)
= FDIF − FXXX (21)
If the log-evidence is calculated this way, positive values reflect
evidence in favor of the DIF model and negative values in favor of
the XXX model (being SQU or MAR), respectively. Values larger
than five are considered “very strong” evidence (Kass and Raftery,
1995; Penny et al., 2004). To summarize, in our evaluation method
we closely followed (Mars et al., 2008).
2.4.6. DIF model parameter identification
The values for the free model parameters, namely αL in (9), τ 1 and
τ 2 (both (A12)), βS [for (11)], α1 in (9), and γ1,2 in (15), have
to be trained on the measured data, i.e., on the trial-by-trial P300
estimates. The model-based P300 estimates are calculated with the
same model parameters for all participants and then used for max-
imization of the DIF model evidence, which is our optimization
criterion, as described in Section 2.4.5.
The calculation of the model evidence for the whole range of
possible combinations of the parameters with a reasonable res-
olution is computationally too expensive. For this reason only
subsets of parameter combinations were optimized simultane-
ously with a resolution of 100 values per parameter, which results
in 30,000 possible parameter combinations for one iteration. In
the first iteration, while optimizing one set of parameters, the not
yet optimized parameters were fixed to the center of their respec-
tive intervals. In the following iteration, parameters not currently
optimized were fixed to the optimal values from the last iteration.
Table 1 |The ranges of the free model parameters, with a resolution of
100 values per parameter.
Parameter Min Max
αL 0.5 0.9
τ1 10 100
τ2 0.1 1
βS 1 10
α1 0.001 0.1
γ1,2 0.5 1
Note that αS is not a free parameter due to the restriction αS =1−αL −α1 and
thus not optimized independently.
In these two iterations a total of 60,000 parameter combinations
have been evaluated, and the set with the highest evidence was
considered optimal. Note that only a locally optimal parameter
combination can be found using this procedure, as many iterations
may be necessary for convergence toward the global optimum, if
it can be found at all. Table 1 gives an overview over the searched
parameter space.
3. RESULTS
3.1. BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
RTs showed clear dependence on stimulus probability (0.3,
M = 373.4 ms, SE = 6.9 ms; 0.5, M = 353.5 ms, SE = 7.7 ms; 0.7,
M = 319.8 ms, SE = 6.4 ms). The slowdown of responding to less
probable stimuli was confirmed by an ANOVA on RTs as a func-
tion of probability, F (2,30)= 80.98, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.84, = 0.95.
Polynomial contrasts revealed a linear trend, F (1,15)= 166.79,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.92, in the absence of a quadratic trend,
F (1,15)= 3.37, p> 0.05.
Error rates similarly showed clear dependence on stim-
ulus probability (0.3, M = 9.6%, SE = 1.6%; 0.5, M = 4.7%,
SE = 0.9%; 0.7, M = 2.1%, SE = 0.4%). The enhanced error
proneness in response to less probable stimuli was confirmed by
an ANOVA on arcsin-transformed error rates as a function of
probability, F (2,30)= 25.19, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.63, = 0.65. Poly-
nomial contrasts revealed a linear trend, F (1,15)= 28.94, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.66 as well as a quadratic trend, F (1,15)= 4.86, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.25.
3.2. CONVENTIONAL ERP RESULTS
Figure 5 depicts grand-average ERP waveforms (upper panels) and
topographic maps (lower panels). Left panels illustrate ERP wave-
forms at Pz that were obtained in the [0.3,0.7] probability category.
Right panels show third-order sequence effects on ERP waveforms
at Pz that were obtained in the [0.5, 0.5] probability category. Note
that sequences of four successive stimuli are illustrated, in tem-
poral order (trial n− 3, trial n− 2, trial n− 1, trial n= eliciting
event); a signifies a particular stimulus, b the other one. For exam-
ple, aaaa gives a description of stimulus a being repeated across
four consecutive trials (shown as green dashed curve), whereas
bbba represents the presentation of stimulus a after having stimu-
lus b repeated across the three immediately preceding trials (shown
as black dashed curve).
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FIGURE 5 | Grand-average waveforms (A,B) and topographic maps
(C,D) of P300 amplitudes. (A,C) Probability effect on P300 amplitudes
in the [0.3, 0.7] probability category. (C) The probability maps show the
scalp topography of the rare-frequent difference wave in the [0.3, 0.7]
probability category at various points in time (276–396 ms, divided into
five windows of 24 ms each). (B,D) Sequence effect on P300 amplitudes
in the [0.5, 0.5] probability category. Note that sequences of four
successive stimuli are illustrated; a signifies a particular stimulus (b the
other one). Note further that the two solid traces, originating from the
abaa and the baba sequences, respectively, show reversed P300
amplitudes. Specifically, for the single -b- sequence abaa, the P300
waveform lies amongst those from dual -bb- sequences, whereas for the
dual -bb- sequence baba, the P300 waveform appears indistinguishable
from the waveforms from single -b- sequences. As further detailed in the
Discussion, this amplitude reversal is attributed to the disconfirmation of
alternation expectation in the abaa sequence, was well as to the
confirmation of alternation expectation in the baba sequence. (D)
Sequence maps show the scalp topography of the bbba-aaaa difference
wave in the [0.5, 0.5] probability category at various points in time
(292–412 ms, divided into five time windows of 24 ms each).
As can be seen from Figure 5A, trial-by-trial P300 esti-
mates showed clear dependence on stimulus probability (0.3,
M = 4.84µV, SE = 0.72µV; 0.5, M = 3.51µV, SE = 0.58µV; 0.7,
M = 2.00µV, SE = 0.52µV). P300 augmentation over stimulus
improbability was confirmed by an ANOVA on P300 ampli-
tudes as a function of probability, F (2,30)= 39.88, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.73, = 0.82. Polynomial contrasts revealed a linear trend,
F (1,15)= 55.49, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.79, in the absence of a quadratic
trend, F (1,15)= 0.17, p> 0.05.
Sequential P300 estimates in the [0.5, 0.5] probability cat-
egory (Figure 5B) yielded main effects of first-, F (1,15)= 6.72,
p< 0.05,η2p = 0.31, second-,F (1,15)= 21.04,p< 0.001,η2p = 0.58,
and third-order sequences, F (1,15)= 6.89, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.32, as
well as a significant three-way first- by second- by third-order
sequence interaction, F (1,15)= 6.70, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.31. First-
order alternations (ba; M = 3.75µV, SE = 0.57µV) were asso-
ciated with enhanced P300 amplitudes compared to first-order
repetitions (aa; M = 3.26µV, SE = 0.59µV). Likewise, second-
order alternations (bxa; M = 3.98µV, SE = 0.64µV) were associ-
ated with enhanced P300 amplitudes compared to second-order
repetitions (axa; M = 3.03µV, SE = 0.51µV). Finally, third-order
alternations (bxxa; M = 3.64µV, SE = 0.58µV) were associated
with enhanced P300 amplitudes compared to third-order repeti-
tions (axxa; M = 3.37µV, SE = 0.57µV). Separate ANOVAs on
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Table 2 |The maximum log-Bayes factors ln(BFDIF−XXX), left panel
ln(BFDIF−SQU), right panel ln(BFDIF−MAR).
ln(BFDIF−SQU) ln(BFDIF−MAR)
35 170
Table 3 |The optimized model parameters.
αL τ1 τ2 αS βS α1 γ1,2
0.83 33.6 0.27 0.12 1.82 0.05 0.94
Note that τ 1 and τ 2 yield βL,1 =40.3 and βL,192 =11787, respectively.
sequential P300 estimates were performed in each second-order
sequence condition to further parse the three-way interaction.
These ANOVAs revealed that the two-way first- by third-order
sequence interaction was not significant when the second-order
sequence consisted of stimulus repetitions (i.e., when xaxa
sequences were included), F (1,15)= 0.94, p> 0.05, whereas the
two-way first- by third-order sequence interaction was significant
when the second-order sequence consisted of stimulus alterna-
tions (i.e., when xbxa sequences were included), F (1,15)= 6.34,
p< 0.05, η2p = 0.30. Further comments on these data are deferred
to the Discussion.
Sequential P300 estimates in the [0.3, 0.7] probability cat-
egory yielded significant main effects of stimulus probabil-
ity, F (1,15)= 44.08, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.75 (0.3, M = 4.59µV,
SE = 0.70µV> 0.7, M = 2.20µV, SE = 0.53µV), of first-order
sequence, F (1,15)= 5.80, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.28 (ba, M = 3.68µV,
SE = 0.58µV> aa, M = 3.10µV, SE = 0.63µV), and of second-
order sequence, F (1,15)= 11.20, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.43 (bxa,
M = 3.81µV, SE = 0.66µV> axa, M = 2.98µV, SE = 0.54µV),
but without interactions between these factors.
3.3. MODEL-BASED TRIAL-BY-TRIAL ANALYSIS
The maximum log-Bayes factors in favor of the DIF model over
the MAR and SQU models are shown in Table 2. In both cases,
this is considered a very strong evidence in favor of the DIF model
(Kass and Raftery, 1995; Penny et al., 2004). Table 3 shows the
free parameters of the DIF model which were used for calcu-
lating the log-Bayes factors in Table 2. Figure 6 illustrates how
the log-Bayes factors vary in dependence on the model parame-
ters, with the tip of the “V” marking the parameter combination
with the highest evidence. It is important to note the relatively
flat tops of the contours implying good generalization capabil-
ity of the DIF model. Due to computational complexity, only
two parameters were optimized simultaneously, as described in
Section 2.4.6. The relatively high value of αL= 0.83 shows that
the subjective probability mainly follows the long-term mem-
ory. With the identified values for τ l and τ 2 we get βL,1= 40.3
and βL,192= 11787, which is further illustrated in Figure A2
in the Appendix. With a short-term memory time constant of
βS= 1.82 and a weight of αS= 0.12 the influence of recent
events to the subjective probability is captured. While the weight
Table 4 | Comparison of the goodness-of-fit in terms of the mean
squared error (MSE) and fraction of variance explained (FVE) of the
fitted model predictions Yˆ`(n).
Model MSE FVE
MAR 6.0106 0.4909
SQU 5.7410 0.5138
DIF 5.6780 0.5191
of the filter modeling alternation expectancy α1= 0.05 appears
to be small, Figure 6C clearly shows the importance of this
contribution.
Figure 7 shows timeline plots for one exemplary participant.
Figures 7A,B show plots of the expectancy Ek=1(n) and the sub-
jective probability Pk=1(n) of seeing stimulus k = 1 on trial n for
the [0.5, 0.5] and [0.3, 0.7] probability category for all competing
models. Figures 7C,D show plots of the expectancy Ek=s(n)(n)
and the subjective probability Pk=s(n)(n) of seeing the actually
occurring stimulus k = s(n) on trial n for both probability cat-
egories and all models. The transition from Figures 7A,B to
Figures 7C,D illustrates that the subjective probability is traced
as a distribution for all possible events k ∈ {1, . . ., K } simulta-
neously over all trials and that at the moment of seeing a new
stimulus k = s(n) only the corresponding subjective probability
of that event k is relevant for the surprise I `(n) and consequently
for the model-based P300 estimate Ŷ`(n). Figures 7E,F show plots
of both the measured and the model-based trial-by-trial P300 esti-
mates Y `(n) and Ŷ`(n) for both probability categories, where the
latter is calculated according to (17). It is visible that the DIF
model estimates are smoother over trials than those of the SQU
model but not as undynamic as the estimates of the MAR model,
which loses its initial dynamic and becomes almost binary over
increasing trial number n. This effect is especially prominent in
Figures 7E,F. Similar consecutive trials n elicit a descent in the
measured trial-by-trial P300 estimate. For small n all models show
this behavior, but for increasing n the MAR model yields nearly
constant estimates.
Furthermore the MAR model does not account appropriately
for the well-documented sequence effects (Squires et al., 1976).
Figure 8 shows the tree diagrams of the measured (Y `(n)) and
model-based (Ŷ`(n)) P300 estimates as a function of the preced-
ing stimuli sequences for the different probability categories. The
DIF and SQU model are both capable of estimating the envelope
and general tree structure quite well, but the SQU model fans
out too much for higher order effects for the frequent stimulus
in the [0.3, 0.7] and in general in the [0.5, 0.5] probability cat-
egory, while for the MAR model higher-order effects are nearly
non-existent.
As an additional measure of goodness-of-fit of the models
Table 4 shows the mean squared error (MSE) and the fraction
of variance explained (FVE) of the fitted model predictions Ŷ`(n).
Although differences appear to be somewhat smaller, still the supe-
riority of the DIF model is evident, supporting the log-Bayes
factors presented in Table 2.
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FIGURE 6 | Log-Bayes factors, ln(BFDIF−XXX), under variation of the model
parameters. The upper contour always shows ln(BFDIF−MAR), the lower one
ln(BFDIF−SQU). The “V” marks the parameter combination with the maximum
log-Bayes factor, cf.Table 3. (A) Variation of the free short-term parameters βS
and αS. (B) Variation of the free long-term parameters τ 1 and τ 2. In order to
keep the lower contour visible, the log-Bayes factors for the 10 smallest
values for τ 2 are not displayed. (C) Variation of the free alternation parameters
γ 1,2 and α1.
4. DISCUSSION
We tested three computational models of trial-by-trial P300 ampli-
tudes using Bayesian model selection (Kass and Raftery, 1995;
Raftery, 1995). Trial-by-trial P300 amplitude estimates at Pz were
obtained in a two-choice RT task. Behavioral data indicated that
on average participants reacted slower and committed more errors
when they responded to rarely occurring stimuli, consistent with
many earlier reports (Miller, 1998). P300 amplitudes showed the
expected relationships with stimulus probability. Further, they
were influenced by the immediately preceding stimulus sequence,
a finding which is also consistent with earlier reports. Thus, our
data replicate two of the most ubiquitous P300 findings, notably
probabilistic and sequential effects on P300 amplitudes.
The DIF model (9) possesses important advantages over previ-
ous models of P300 amplitude fluctuations. It relies completely
on mathematical notations and definitions, unlike the notions
of expectancy (Squires et al., 1976), global vs. local probability
(Squires et al., 1976), temporal probability (Gonsalvez and Polich,
2002), or context updating (Donchin and Coles, 1988). It is a for-
mal model, akin to the MAR model (Mars et al., 2008), but it offers
a more parsimonious explanation of trial-by-trial P300 fluctua-
tions. The competitive advantage of the DIF model over the MAR
model stems, in large part, from the non-negligible contribution
of the short-term traces to subjective estimates of event probabil-
ities, as evidenced by the scarce sensitivity of the MAR model to
the sequential effects on P300 amplitudes (Figures 7 and 8).
The SQU model of P300 amplitude fluctuations (Squires et al.,
1976) can be considered as a precursor of our DIF model insofar
as it comprised memory for event frequencies within the prior
stimulus sequence (equivalent to the short-term trace) and event
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FIGURE 7 |Timeline plots for one exemplary participant.
(A,C,E) Probability category [0.5, 0.5]. (B,D,F) Probability category
[0.3, 0.7]. Green symbols denote the stimuli s(n)∈ {1,2} as they
occurred. (A,B) Subjective probabilities P k=1(n) and expectancies
E k=1(n) from (5), (7), and (9) for MAR, SQU, and DIF, respectively,
for stimulus s(n)=1. (C,D) Subjective probabilities P k=s(n)(n) and
expectancies E k=s(n)(n) for the actually presented stimulus k = s(n).
(E,F) The measured P300 estimates Y `(n) and the model-based
P300 estimates Ŷ`(n) of the MAR, SQU, and DIF models,
respectively.
probabilities (loosely related to the long-term trace). Yet, the long-
term contribution to the DIF model does not incorporate global
event probabilities, Pk, themselves, but rather subjective estimates,
cL,k (n), of these probabilities, these being based on counting
observed events in continuously larger samples. Thus, subjec-
tive probability estimates are constantly revised while evidence
is accumulating, and the DIF model is a pure model of subjec-
tive statistical parameters, rather than a mixture of subjective and
objective parameters such as the SQU model.
Given the hereby documented superiority of the DIF model
over its competitors, we will shortly consider some of its cor-
nerstones. To begin with, it is important to view the DIF model
in the context of the processing of event frequencies (Sedlmeier
and Betsch, 2002). In particular, the reliable encoding of the
frequency with which events occur (Underwood, 1969; Hintz-
man, 1976) led to the claim that event frequency is automatically
encoded in memory, placing only minimal demands on atten-
tional resources (Hasher and Zacks, 1984; Zacks and Hasher,
2002). A variety of representation modes for memory for event
frequency can be envisaged. According to multiple-trace views
(Hintzman, 1976), a record of individual events is stored such
that each attended occurrence of an event results in an indepen-
dent memory trace. In contrast, according to strength views, each
attended event occurrence produces an increment in the strength
of a single memory trace or a frequency counter (Alba et al.,
1980), supporting the event frequency counter assumption which
is inherent in the DIF model. Both, the short-term, cS,k (n), and
the long-term, cL,k (n), memory traces are frequency counters (11)
and (13).
The retention functions describing the short-term and long-
term traces in the DIF model are of exponential-decay nature (Lu
et al., 2005), differing mainly with regard to their decay half-lives.
The dual decay rate assumption is compatible with the fact that
short-term and long-term memory functions depend on disso-
ciable neuronal processes (Jonides et al., 2008). Further, recent
functional brain imaging data suggest different distributions of
cortical responses for short-term and long-term decay functions
(Harrison et al., 2011).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 6 | Article 359 | 11
Kolossa et al. Trial-by-trial modeling of predictive surprise
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
orderorderorderorder
Y
(n
),
Y
(n
)[
µ
V
]
Measured P300 DIF estimate SQU estimate MAR estimate
aaa
a ba
ba
baba
aa
aa
aa
aa
bba
bba
bba
bba
abaabaabaaba baa
baabaabaa
aaa
aaa
aaaaaa
bbba
bbba
bbba
bbba
abba
abba
abbaabba
babababababababa a
aaba
aaba
aaba
bbaabbaa
bbaa
bbaa a
abaa
abaa
abaa
a
baaabaaa
baaa aaaa
aaaa
aaaaaaaa
(A) Probability category [0.5, 0.5]
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
orderorderorderorder
Y
(n
),
Y
(n
)[
µ
V
]
Measured P300 DIF estimate SQU estimate MAR estimate
bbb
b
ab
ab
ab
ab
bb
bbbbbb
aab
aab
aab
aab
bab
bab
bab
bab
abb
abb
abb
abb
bbb
bbb
bbb
bbb
aaab
aaab
aaab
aaab
baab
baab
baab
baab
abababababab
abab
bbab
bbab
bbabbbab
aabbaabb
aabb
aabb
ab
babb
babbbabb
abbb
abbbabbb
abbb
bbbb
bbbb
bbbb
bbbb
(B) Probability category [0.3, 0.7], P b = 0 .7
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
3 2 1 0
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
orderorderorderorder
Y
(n
),
Y
(n
)[
µ
V
]
Measured P300 DIF estimate SQU estimate MAR estimate
aa
aa
baba
baba
aa
aa
aa
aa
bba
bbabbabba
aba
abaaba
aba
baa
baa
baa
baa
aaa
aaa
aaaaaa
bbba
bbba
bbba
bbba
abbaabba
abba
abba
baba
baba
babababa
aabaaaba
aaba
aaba
bbaa
bbaa
bbaa
bbaa ba
abaa
abaaabaa
baaa
baaa
baaa
baaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
(C) Probability category [0.3, 0.7], P a = 0 .3
A
B C
FIGURE 8 |Tree diagrams of measured P300 estimatesY `(n)
and model-based P300 estimates Ŷ`(n) as a function of the
sequence of preceding stimuli. Within each order (0–3), the
stimulus sequence is labeled, and related sequences are
connected by lines. (A) For both stimuli on probability category
[0.5, 0.5]. (B) For the frequently occurring stimulus b on probability
category [0.3, 0.7]. (C) For the rarely occurring stimulus a on
probability category [0.3, 0.7].
The optimal short-term time constant βS approximated the
value of two. Note that the DIF model does not allow for vari-
ations in βS, implying that the short-term contribution to the
subjective probability for the appearance of event k on trial n,
Pk=s(n)(n), occurs stable over the progression of n. In contrast,
βL,n varies as a function of n (A12), with γ L,n gradually approxi-
mating the value of one. βL,n (and hence γ L,n) are relatively low
during early trials when compared to late trials within blocks of
trials (Figure A2 in Appendix). On the one hand, the long-term
quality of the long-term contribution to Pk=s(n)(n) is gradu-
ally increasing as a function of n, as revealed by the dynamics
of the long-term low-pass filter (Figure 4). In other words, the
decay half-life of the long-term trace gradually increases when the
observer experiences more and more trials. On the other hand,
the recursive formulation of the long-term contribution in the
DIF model (14) reveals that the balance between the most recently
experienced stimuli (which occurred on trial n− 1, weighted by
(1− γ L,n−1)) and the counted frequency (weighted by γ L,n−1) is
biased toward recent stimuli during early trials (when γ L,n−1 is
relatively low), but biased toward the counted frequency during
late trials (when γ L,n−1 is relatively high). Thus, the DIF model
postulates that the decay half-life of the long-term trace evolves
dynamically with the amount of experience. The observer is mod-
eled to rely more and more on environmental experience rather
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than on prior assumptions, possibly reflecting the fact that the
exploitation of statistical redundancy becomes gradually more
reliable with progressing time (Barlow, 2001).
Visual working memory (vWM, Baddeley, 2003) can maintain
representations of only around four objects at any given moment
(Cowan, 2005). The surprisingly limited vWM capacity offers a
rationale for the assumption of a capacity-limited alternation term
in the DIF model (15), c1,k (n). Its finite impulse response (FIR)
characteristic resembles the alternation term in the SQU model
(Squires et al., 1976). This FIR high-pass filter searches for alter-
nation patterns over short sequences of trials (such as those in
abab and in baba sequences). The discovery of such patterns leads
one to expect the completion of the pattern in the upcoming trial,
an expectation which will be confirmed in the ababa sequence,
but will be disconfirmed in the babaa sequence. It is important
that alternation expectation appears conditional upon the detec-
tion of alternation patterns in vWM, as revealed by the larger
P300 amplitudes in response to ba sequences compared to aa
sequences (Figure 8). Thus, the detection of alternation patterns
in vWM entrains alternation expectation, as evidenced by our data
(Figure 5B, see also Jentzsch and Sommer, 2001; Ford et al., 2010).
Further, the effects of pattern completion (such as baba sequences)
vs. pattern violation (such as abaa sequences) might underlie the
first- by second- by third-order sequence interaction which we
identified in the [0.5, 0.5] probability category.
While the effects of alternation expectation are non-negligibly
measurable at Pz, visual inspection of our data at more anterior
electrode sites suggested that these alternation expectancy effects
might possess a more anterior, i.e., P3a-like scalp topography than
the proper event frequency effects which showed the typical, P3b-
like scalp topography (Polich, 2007; Duncan et al., 2009). While
these initial observations ask for multi-channel data analyses, the
present modeling work should be mainly considered as a model
for P3b generation, since the task procedures (all stimuli required
a button press) and the ERP waveforms [i.e., their scalp distribu-
tion (cf. Figure 5) and peak latencies] favor an interpretation in
terms of predominant P3b-potentials.
The DIF model offers a digital filtering account of multiple
memory systems in the brain (Figures 1–4). Specifically, the DIF
model characterizes frequency memory as two digital first-order
infinite impulse response (IIR) low-pass filters, one filter with
an experience-invariant short-term exponential-decay function
(Figure 2), and another filter with an experience-dependent long-
term exponential-decay function, such that the low-pass character-
istic becomes progressively apparent as the amount of experience
increases (Figure 3). Moreover, vWM is conceptualized as an addi-
tional fourth-order finite impulse response (FIR) high-pass filter
(Figure 9). The input signal gk(n) in (10) to all three filters is a
binary representation of the stimulus sequence, with all samples
prior to the first trial filled with the uniform initial prior.
Our theory of variation in trial-by-trial P300 amplitudes bears
implications on the nature of cortical processing. It is in agree-
ment with the predictive coding approach (Friston, 2002, 2005;
Spratling, 2010). Viewed from this perspective, predictive sur-
prise – and hence trial-by-trial P300 amplitude – is proportional
to the residual error between top-down priors and bottom-up
sensory evidence. Predictive coding theory is a successful guiding
gk(n)
γ∆,1 γ∆,2
1
C∆
γ∆,4γ∆,3
c∆,k(n)
TTTT
FIGURE 9 | Block diagram of the fourth-order finite impulse response
(FIR) filter H1(f ). Elements T represent a delay of one trial, the
multipliers γ 1,i compose the filter coefficients and C1 constitutes a
normalizing constant.
model for functional neuroimaging and electrophysiological stud-
ies of sensory cortical processing (Summerfield et al., 2006; Gar-
rido et al., 2009; Summerfield and Egner, 2009; Egner et al., 2010;
Rauss et al., 2011; Winkler and Czigler, 2011). Further, the DIF
model is a Bayesian model of cortical processing (Knill and Pouget,
2004; Friston, 2005). It conceives performance on our two-choice
RT task as sequential Bayesian learning (MacKay, 2003), with
initial prior knowledge being conceptualized as a uniform prior
probability distribution (10), consistent with Laplace’s Principle
of Indifference.
It is important to note that we do not claim that the observed
P300 modulations were exclusively related to predictive surprise
over sensory input, since in the present task design the probabil-
ities of sensory events were mirrored on probabilities of motor
responses, as each stimulus was mapped onto a distinct motor
response. Thus, particular stimuli also called for particular motor
programs, and it could be that the observed P300 modulations
are related to predictive surprise over motor responses. We deliber-
ately leave it open whether the observed P300 modulations were
due to surprise conveyed by the visual stimuli, or whether they
were related to surprise associated with the selection of a motor
response, given a visual stimulus on each trial (Barceló et al., 2008;
O’Connell et al., 2012).
The DIF model specifies how predictive surprise determines
trial-by-trial P300 amplitudes, seemingly representing barely more
than a re-iteration of Donchin’s (1981) surprise hypothesis of P300
amplitude fluctuations. However, one should not confuse predic-
tive surprise, as defined by the DIF model, with Bayesian surprise
(Ostwald et al., 2012). Bayesian surprise numeralizes the diver-
gence between P1(n), . . ., PK(n) and P1(n+ 1), . . ., PK(n+ 1),
i.e., the divergence between probability distributions across suc-
cessive trials which can be computed using the Kullback–Leibler
metric (Baldi and Itti, 2010). Bayesian surprise thus quantifies the
revision of the internal model of the world, given stimulus s(n),
whereas predictive surprise I (n) in (2) refers to the unpredictabil-
ity of s(n), given the internal model immediately before observing
s(n). To conclude, we propose a formal computational model of
predictive surprise, along with a strategy for testing the model’s
ability to predict trial-by-trial P300 amplitudes.
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APPENDIX
ALTERNATION EXPECTATION OF THE SQU MODEL
This Appendix gives computational details on the expectation
w.r.t. alternating stimuli c˘1,k(n), as required in (7) and described
in words in Squires et al. (1976). The expectation w.r.t. alternating
stimuli, and how this expectancy is met by the present stimulus
s(n) is given as:
c˘1,k (n) = uk (n) · (min {Nalt − 2, 0} + Nalt)
∈ {− (Ndepth − 2) , ...,−3,−2, 0,+2,+3, ..., (Ndepth − 2)}
(A1)
with N depth= 5. The use of the minimum function ensures that an
expectation for alternation requires at least N alt= 2 consecutive
previous stimulus alternations. Following Squires et al. (1976), its
sign
uk (n) = 2 · |dk (n)− dk (n − 1) | − 1 ∈ {−1,+1} (A2)
is negative (uk(n)=−1) if stimulus s(n) violates the alternation
expectation [i.e., s(n) and s(n− 1) are identical]. On the other
hand, if the alternation expectation is met [i.e., s(n) and s(n− 1)
differ from each other], the sign is positive: uk(n)=+1. The num-
ber of previous alternations in a row constitutes the amplitude of
the expectation, which is given by
Nalt = arg max
N ′alt∈N
N ′alt∏
ν=1
[2 |dk (n − ν)− dk (n − ν − 1)|] (A3)
with1 N = {1,2, . . ., (N depth− 2)}.
ALTERNATION EXPECTATION OF THE DIF MODEL
This Appendix gives details on the coefficients γ1,n−ν and the
probability normalizing constants C and C1. Figure 9 shows the
block diagram of this fourth order finite impulse response filter. In
order to reduce the complexity of the model by keeping the num-
ber of independent parameters small, only the coefficient γ1,2 is
chosen freely within the range 0≤ γ1,2≤ γ1,max. The effect of the
multiplicative constant C1 and additive constant C (as shown in
Figure 1) is merely to ensure 0≤ c1,k (n)+ 1/C ≤ 1. Thus, γ1,max
can be set to an arbitrary value if some constraints are met: The
filter coefficients are set following γ1,1=− γ1,2, γ1,3=− γ1,4,
and γ1,4= γ1,max− γ1,2. The normalizing constants have to
be set according to: C1= γ1,max+ γ1,2+ γ1,4= 2γ1,max and
C = γ1,max+γ1,2+γ1,4
γ1,max
= 2. We chose γ1,max= 1.
ON COUNT FUNCTIONS AND DIGITAL FILTERS (DIF MODEL)
In this Appendix we present some mathematical details of the
DIF model, its constants, and its relation to the count functions.
1As an example, Squires et al. (1976) have given the values of c˘1,k (n)
for K= 2, N depth= 5, and s(n)= k= 1 (which shall be denoted as a):
(s(n− 4)s(n− 3)s(n− 2)s(n− 1)s(n))= bbaba: c˘1,k (n) = +2, ababa :
c˘1,k (n) = +3, babaa : c˘1,k (n) = −3, aabaa : c˘1,k (n) = −2; all other 12
fourth order sequences xxxxa terminating with a yield c˘1,k (n) = 0 according to the
minimum function in (A1).
We will show that the count functions (11) for cS,k (n) and (13)
for cL,k (n) are equivalent to their recursive formulations (12) and
(14), respectively. To this end we will transform the block diagram
of Figure 3 to obtain the count functions from the new resulting
block diagrams.
Figure A1A shows the block diagram of Figure 3 according
to (14) with some notation omitted. A delay of one trial is rep-
resented by T , the input signal is defined as gk(n), the output
signal as cL,k(n), (1− γ L,n−1) and γ L,n−1 are time-dependent val-
ues. The multiplier (1− γ L,n−1) can be moved to the right yielding
the block diagram shown in Figure A1B. Figure A1C shows the
block diagram after moving (1− γ L,n−1) even further to the right.
Finally, when moving the multiplier γ L,n−1/(1− γ L,n−1) to the
right of the lower branch delay unit, the time dependency has to
be accounted for as is shown in Figure A1D. For the long-term
filter we obtain an effective filter coefficient
γ ′L,n = γ L,n
1− γ L,n−1
1− γ L,n
= e−
1
βL,n
1− e−
1
βL,n−1
1− e−
1
βL,n
,
(A4)
while for the short-term filter this simplifies to
γ ′S,n = γS = e−
1
βS . (A5)
The time-varying discrete-time impulse response of the long-
term filter depicted in Figure A1D is given as
hL,ν (n) =  (n − ν − 1) 1− γ L,n−1
γ ′L,n
n∏
υ=ν+1
γ ′L,υ (A6)
with n(>ν) being the currently observed trial, and ν being the trial
when the stimulus initiated the impulse response. We make use of
the step function
 (n − ν − 1) =
{
0, n − ν − 1 < 0
1, n − ν − 1 ≥ 0. (A7)
Substituting (A4) in (A6) yields
hL,ν (n) =  (n − ν − 1) 1− γ L,n
γ L,n
n∏
υ=ν+1
γ ′L,υ
=  (n − ν − 1) 1
CL,n
n∏
υ=ν+1
γ ′L,υ
(A8)
with the dynamic normalizing value CL,n = γ L,n1−γ L,n . The input-
output relation of this time-varying linear system is given by (c.f.
Claasen and Mecklenbräuker, 1982; Prater and Loeffler, 1992):
cL,k (n) =
∞∑
ν=−∞
hL,ν (n) gk (ν) . (A9)
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T
T
1 − γL ,n−1
γL ,n−1
(A)
gk (n) cL ,k (n)
T
T
1
1− γ L ,n − 1
γL ,n−1
1 − γL ,n−1
(B)
gk (n) cL ,k (n)
T
T
γ L ,n − 1
1− γ L ,n − 1 1 − γL ,n−1
1 − γL ,n−1
(C)
gk (n) cL ,k (n)
T
T
γL ,n =
γ L ,n
1− γ L ,n (1− γL ,n−1 )
1 − γL ,n−1
(D)
A
C
B
D
FIGURE A1 | Illustration of the equivalence of the digital filter (14)
(Figure 3) to the count function as in (13). (A) Block diagram of the DIF
model’s long-term memory filter of Figure 3 and (14) with input signal
gk(n) and output signal cL,k(n). (B) Block diagram of a filter equivalent to
(A), where the multiplier (1− γ L,n−1) has been moved to the right. (C)
Block diagram of a filter equivalent to (B), where the multiplier
(1− γ L,n−1) has been moved even further to the right. (D) Block diagram
of a filter equivalent to (C), where the multiplier γ L,n−1/(1− γ L,n−1) has
been moved to the right of the delay unit in the lower branch.
Due to the step function (A7) in the impulse response (A6)
only stimuli at trials ν ≤ n− 1 contribute to the output at trial n
and we obtain
cL,k (n) =
n−1∑
ν=−∞
hL,ν (n) gk (ν)
= 1
CL,n
n−1∑
ν=−∞
(
n∏
υ=ν+1
γ ′L,υ
)
gk (ν)
= 1
CL,n
n−1∑
ν=−∞
γ L,n (ν) gk (ν) ,
(A10)
which is exactly the long-term count function (13) with γ L,n (ν) =∏n
υ=ν+1 γ ′L,υ =
∏n
υ=ν+1 γ L,υ
1−γ L,υ−1
1−γ L,υ , and gk(ν), as before. Note
that for the short-term filter we obtain
∏n
υ=ν+1 γS = γ n−νS
and CS= γ S/(1− γ S), which simplifies (A10) to the discrete-time
convolution
cS,k (n) = 1CS
n−1∑
ν=−∞
γ n−νS gk (ν) , (A11)
which is the short-term count function (11). Thus, equivalence
has been shown between the count functions (11) and (13), and
their simple recursive formulations (12) and (14), respectively. The
behavior of the dynamic long-term time value βL,n follows:
βL,n =
e
−
(
1
τ1
·1+ 1
τ2
)
, if n ≤ 0
e
−
(
1
τ1
·n+ 1
τ2
)
, otherwise,
(A12)
with normalized time constants τ 1, τ 2, controlling the speed
of transition from reliance on prior assumptions to experience.
The time value 0≤βL,n <∞ holds βL,n >βS. The effect of this
dynamic formulation of βL,n is further illustrated in Figure A2
which shows the values of βL,n and the corresponding forgetting
factor γ L,n = e−
1
βL,n for trials n ∈ {1, . . . N } with N = 192.
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FIGURE A2 |The dynamics of the coefficients γ L,n (solid) and βL,n
(dashed) over trials n=1, . . ., N, with N = 192.
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